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Selected Publications:

Books:

Boag, S. (2012). Freudian repression, the unconscious, and the dynamics of inhibition. London: Karnac.

Boag, S. & Tiliopoulos, N. (Eds.) (2011). Personality and Individual Differences: Theory, Assessment and Application. New York: Nova.

Boag, S. (Ed.) (2008). Personality Down Under: Perspectives from Australia. New York: Nova.

Journal Articles:

Boag, S. (2011). Explanation in personality psychology: ‘verbal magic' & the Five-Factor Model. Philosophical Psychology, 24 (2), 223-243.

Abstract:

Scientific psychology involves both identifying and classifying phenomena of interest (description) and revealing the causes and mechanisms that contribute towards these phenomena arising (explanation). Within personality psychology, some propose that aspects of behaviour and cognition can be explained with reference to personality traits. However, certain conceptual and logical issues cast doubt upon the satisfactoriness of traits as coherent explanatory constructs. This paper discusses ‘explanation' in psychology and the problems of circularity and reification. An analysis of relations and intrinsic properties is then developed to address the logical requirements necessary for circumventing these problems. An examination of McCrae and Costa's defense of traits as explanatory constructs, in terms of ‘tendencies' and ‘dispositions', highlights logical issues that prevent traits, so defined, from explaining trait-like behaviours and cognitions. The logical requirements for a coherent trait explanatory account are outlined and possible explanatory directions in trait-approaches are discussed. The ongoing tendency towards fallacious reasoning in psychology and suggestions for preventing this are further examined.

Boag, S. (2010). Repression, suppression, & conscious awareness. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 27 (2), 164-181.

Abstract:

Both ‘repression' and ‘suppression' are said to involve removing mental content from awareness. However, repression is generally said to be unconscious whereas suppression is said to be conscious. The meanings of the terms ‘unconscious' and ‘conscious', though, are open to a variety of interpretations and so the validity of this distinction is uncertain . This paper discusses the relationship between repression and suppression and whether conscious awareness distinguishes these processes. Consciousness and unconscious are discussed in terms of a relational account of cognition where ‘knowing' is understood as a relation between a cognising subject and a cognised object term. On this view, problems arise from confusing consciousness and unconsciousness with properties or qualities of mental processes. Examined in this light, the present analysis reveals that repression can become conscious and that suppression can occur unconsciously. The role of ‘resistance' and the recognition of a series of defenses are discussed.

Boag, S. (2008). 'Mind as feeling' or affective relations? A contribution to the school of Andersonian realism. Theory & Psychology, 18 (4), 505-525.

Abstract:

Andersonian realism is a determinist, empiricist position that acknowledges the important distinction between qualities and relations. However, Anderson’s ‘mind as feeling’ thesis, proposing that the mind’s qualities are emotional, is problematic since it fails to account for ‘feelings’ themselves. O’Neil’s (1934) alternative relational account of affects, in conjunction with Maze’s (1983) theory of instinctual drives, provides a coherent platform for developing a comprehensive realist account of affects. In discussing the relation between affects, cognition and motivation, affects are viewed as drive-evaluative phenomena, and ‘feelings’ are known bodily states arising in conjunction with motivationally driven environmental evaluations. The role that affects play in a revised desire/belief model of behaviour explanation is discussed.

Boag, S. (2007). Pathological science & the myth of recovered memories: Reply to McNally. Review of General Psychology, 11 (4), 361-362.

Abstract:

Richard McNally’s thoughtful commentary points to a non-controversial source of the fixation with Freud’s early theory of repression. At the same time, however, McNally’s account does not directly address the critical issue at the heart of my original article, namely that Freud’s later theory of repression is persistently misconceptualised and accompanied by a breakdown in critical inquiry. Although the account proposed by McNally does not necessarily contradict this proposal, other potential sources of bias should also be considered. In particular, the acrimony provoked by the recovered memory dispute and the prevalence of ad hominem attacks against Freud suggests that emotional factors may also be obscuring rigorous debate. Issues surrounding the scientific inquiry of Freud’s theory of repression are further discussed.

Boag, S. (2007). Realism, self-deception, & the logical paradox of repression. Theory & Psychology, 17 (3), 421-447.

Abstract:

Historically, repression has been considered a cornerstone of psychoanalytic theory. However, explaining how the ego maintains repression without knowing the repressed appears to create a logical paradox of knowing in order not to know. Maze and Henry’s realist analysis of the problem provides an important new direction for framing possible solutions. However, their proposed explanation in terms of ‘affective blocking’ is found to be limited with respect to explaining important features of repression, such as the clinical phenomenon of resistance. Alternatively, the present thesis proposes that a solution can be provided in terms of strong partitioning and neural inhibition. The resolution of the paradox hinges upon the recognition that repression inhibits knowledge of knowing the repressed. Implications of this position for understanding self-deception are discussed.

Boag, S. (2007). 'Real processes' & the explanatory status of repression & inhibition. Philosophical Psychology, 20 (3), 375-392.

Abstract:

The recent interest in neuroscientific psychodynamic research (‘Neuro-psychoanalysis’) has meant that empirical findings are emerging which allow greater public scrutiny of psychodynamic concepts. However, Macmillan (1991) claims that the psychoanalytic cornerstone, ‘repression’, is a circular explanatory term and incapable of referring to a ‘real process’. This paper discusses Macmillan’s criticism and finds that repression is a coherent explanatory term and is not precluded from referring to real processes. Specifically, ‘neural inhibition’, triggered by social factors, can account for Freudian repression, without succumbing to circular explanation. Recent developments in neuroscience suggest that a plausible mechanism of inhibition exists, providing testable avenues for the ‘cornerstone’ of psychoanalysis. Evidence of the role of the frontal lobes, a brain area that appears to mediate the influence of social factors upon impulse control, demonstrates that repression is plausible within a dynamic neural framework.

Boag, S. (2006). Can repression become a conscious process? Behavioral & Brain Sciences, 29 (5), 513-4.

Abstract:

A major weakness in Erdelyi's account concerns the claim that repression can become conscious. A relational account of cognition demonstrates that if repression is successful, then the repressive act cannot become known. Additionally, “resistance” further distinguishes “repression” from “suppression.” Rather than blurring the distinction between these processes, it is possible to recognise a series of defences. Suggestions are provided for alternative research avenues.

Boag, S. (2006). “Freudian dream theory, dream bizarreness, & the disguise-censor controversy”: Response to Commentaries. Neuro-psychoanalysis, 8 (1), 59-68. Download PDF

Boag, S. (2006). Freudian dream theory, dream bizarreness, & the disguise-censor controversy. Neuro-psychoanalysis, 8 (1), 5-16. Download PDF

Abstract:

One particular area of contention in discussions of Freudian dream theory and its relation to the neuroscientific evidence is the notion of ‘disguise-censorship’ and its relation to dream bizarreness. The discussion to date, however, has neglected the conceptual basis of repression and disguise-censorship and this paper aims to clarify the role of repression in dreaming and its contribution to dream bizarreness. An analysis of disguise-censorship and repression reveals two competing accounts in Freud’s theory. Freud’s account of the ‘dream-censor’, acting as an agency intentionally disguising cognitive content, is found to be problematic. However, Freud’s alternative account of repression, in terms of cognitive inhibition instigated by motivational conflict, is developed and discussed in relation to neural inhibition. On this view, dream bizarreness arises, in part, through inter-drive competition preventing direct expression of wishes and the subsequent formation of substitute aims. Resolution of certain contradictions and inconsistencies between the neurological evidence and Freudian dream theory are discussed.

Boag, S. (2006). Freudian repression, the common view, and pathological science. Review of General Psychology, 10 (1), 74-86.

Abstract:

A sustained misconceptualisation of a theory leading to invalid applications and inferences indicates a failure in the scientific process. This has repeatedly occurred with Freud’s theory of repression, a cornerstone of psychoanalytic theory. This paper traces the development of Freud’s theory of repression and compares this with the ‘common view’ found in mainstream psychology: the motivated forgetting of trauma. A fixation with Freud’s original, and superseded theory (1893-1897) ignores the theoretical developments that constitute mature psychoanalysis (1900-1940), and has impacted upon attempts to test Freudian theory and the current ‘recovered memory’ debate. Although certain accidental factors contribute to this misunderstanding, the sustained failure to comprehend Freudian repression reveals a scientific pathology. Implications for psychology as a whole are discussed.

Boag, S. (2005). Addressing mental plurality: Justification, objections & logical requirements of strongly partitive accounts of mind. Theory & Psychology, 15 (6), 747-767.

Abstract:

Strongly partitive accounts deviate radically from the common view of a single, unified knower or self within each ‘person’, proposing instead an account of multiple knowers. This view is justified by consideration of mental conflict, and objections, including the view that conflict does not require strong partitioning, that there exists a tension between ‘persons’ and ‘parts’, and the problem of homunculi, are found not to hold. However, the problems of proposing partitioning ad hoc and ad libitum are genuine concerns that any account of mental plurality must address. The realist account of cognition, proposing that cognition is a relation between subject and object terms existing independently of the cognitive relation, provides a conceptual basis for evaluating strongly partitive accounts. On this view, any account of knowers, either singular or plural, must be capable of specifying their intrinsic qualities. Pears’s account is found to be problematic here since it fails to meet this logical requirement. Maze’s account is found to satisfy this requirement, providing in-principle means of characterizing the multiple knowers.

Book Chapters:

Boag, S. (2011). The role of conceptual analysis in personality research. In S. Boag & N. Tiliopoulos (Eds.), Personality and Individual Differences: Theory, Assessment and Application (pp. 321-330) . New York: Nova.

Abstract:

The proliferation of personality and individual differences constructs is testament to the vibrancy of research in this field. Furthermore, all such constructs would make some claim to receiving empirical support. However, while additional empirical research will help further determine the merit of these conceptions, this paper proposes that conceptual analysis is another tool available to researchers to help critically evaluate our constructs of interest. Conceptual analysis involves assessing both the clarity and coherency of our constructs as well as examining the relations between them. A useful direction here is scrutinising constructs in terms of intrinsic properties (what something is ) and relations (what something does ) to help both clarify and evaluate the coherency of these constructs, as well as build bridges between apparently disparate concepts. Given the perceived need for unification in psychology, conceptual analysis provides yet another tool for assessing the relationship of constructs to one another and contributing to a coherent account of ‘persons'. While conceptual analysis may appear to be too ‘philosophical' to some, it is none other than our critical thinking skills in action. Implications for personality psychology are discussed.

Boag, S. (2010). Description and explanation within personality psychology research. In R. E. Hicks (Ed.), Personality and Individual Differences: Current Directions (pp. 21-29). Bowen Hills, QLD: Australian Academic Press.

Abstract:

Personality psychology generally involves both describing personality factors and explaining how such factors arise and go on to influence other things. However, since there are various meanings of the term ‘personality', and the causal role of personality is often ambiguous, there are numerous theoretical and practical problems involved in both of these pursuits. This paper proposes a theoretical framework for clarifying both the descriptive and explanatory tasks within personality psychology. The work of description is discussed here in terms of classifying personality factors in terms of intrinsic properties and relationships. The importance of causal antecedents and mechanisms for explanation in personality psychology is then addressed, and problems with teleology and constitutive relations identified. The ‘self' is used to illustrate problems in both personality description and explanation and suggestions for avoiding potential theoretical and conceptual problems within personality research are discussed.

Boag, S. (2008). Is language necessary for consciousness? An assessment of Freud's ‘word/thing' presentation distinction. In S. Boag (Ed.), Personality Down Under: Perspectives from Australia (pp. 81-89). New York: Nova.

Abstract:

The belief that language is a necessary condition for consciousness is common within psychoanalytic literature. This, in turn, has led to accounts of ‘passive primal repression', where pre-verbal mental content cannot become conscious at a later time. This paper discusses consciousness and unconsciousness as certain relations rather than as qualities of mental processes. On this view, to be conscious of mental content requires taking it as the object of a second mental act. The view that language is a necessary condition for consciousness is rejected on the basis that applying language to mental content requires knowing the mental content first (i.e., being conscious of it). Implications for primal repression theory, and the manner in which language may facilitate becoming conscious awareness, are discussed.

Boag, S. (2008). A brief history of personality and individual differences research in Australia. In S. Boag (Ed.), Personality Down Under: Perspectives from Australia (pp. 7-20). New York: Nova. Download PDF

Abstract:

While there are various accounts describing the development of Australian psychology generally there exists at present no account of the development of personality and individual differences research within Australia specifically. This paper provides an overview of the development of personality and individual differences research within Australia through examining the research interests of the pioneers of Australian psychology. This reveals that Australian psychology from the beginning was, both in theory and practice, chiefly a psychology of personality and individual differences. This chapter highlights key theoretical directions in Australian personality research, as well as noting practical applications of personality and individual differences research to clinical psychology, education and industry. The early contributions from the pioneers of Australian psychology to this field are highlighted, and their impact on later developments within personality and individual differences research discussed.

Boag, S. (2008). Making sense of subliminal perception. In A. M. Columbus (Ed.), Advances in Psychology Research (pp. 117-139). New York: Nova. Download PDF

Abstract:

Considerable confusion surrounds the notion of 'subliminal perception'. While empirical findings from subliminal perception experiments appear to demonstrate that subliminal perception can both occur and lead to a variety of (often dramatic) effects, the present conceptualisations of subliminal perception are problematic since they fail to clarify specifically what is, and is not, known when perceiving subliminally. Consequently, accounts of subliminal perception are vulnerable to sceptical disbelief and criticism, since the coherency of the theoretical framework has not been adequately established. This paper reviews the current accounts and evidence of subliminal perception and proposes a framework for clarifying existing thinking. ‘Knowing' is discussed as a relation between a cognising subject and a cognised object term, which provides a platform for clarifying the questions concerning the subject and object terms involved when discussing subliminal perception. On this view, in knowing one does not automatically know that one knows (i.e., one can know something without having knowledge of knowing it). Furthermore, ‘becoming conscious’ (knowing that one knows) requires a second mental act, independent of the first act of knowing. This theoretical position unifies the competing accounts of subliminal perception, and provides a clear conceptualisation of perception and its objects when perceiving subliminally. Additionally, this account provides an avenue for investigating experimental manipulations of subliminal perception, as well as explaining why subliminal stimuli presentations, and not supraliminal ones, lead to the specific variety of empirical findings found in subliminal perception research. Directions for future research based on this approach are discussed.

Reviews:

Boag, S. (2011). Transcending the body-culture dichotomy in Jungian thinking? More questions than answers [ Review of the book Body, mind, and healing After Jung: A space of questions ]. PsycCRITIQUES-Contemporary Psychology: APA Review of Books , 56 (31).

Boag, S. (2011). Freud and free-will: Fact, fantasy, and philosophy [Review of the book Freud, the reluctant philosopher]. PsycCRITIQUES-Contemporary Psychology: APA Review of Books, 56 (6).

Boag, S. (2009). Does psychology really need another personality textbook? [Review of the book Personality theories: Critical perspectives]. PsycCRITIQUES-Contemporary Psychology: APA Review of Books, 54 (41).

Boag, S. (2009). Cognitive Epidemiology and the challenges of understanding the causes of mental ability across the lifespan [Review of the book A lifetime of intelligence: Follow-up studies of the Scottish Mental Surveys of 1932 and 1947]. PsycCRITIQUES-Contemporary Psychology: APA Review of Books, 54 (20).

Boag, S. (2009). Reflections on mentalization and a future for psychoanalysis [Review of the book Mind to mind: Infant research, neuroscience, and psychoanalysis]. PsycCRITIQUES-Contemporary Psychology: APA Review of Books, 54 (14).

Boag, S. (2008). How far have we come since the Age of Enlightenment? [Review of the book Brain, mind and medicine: Essays in Eighteenth-century neuroscience]. PsycCRITIQUES-Contemporary Psychology: APA Review of Books, 53 (26).

Boag, S. (2008). Re-discovering the embodied self [Review of the book Passions and tempers: A history of the humours]. PsycCRITIQUES-Contemporary Psychology: APA Review of Books, 53 (8).

Boag, S. (2007). Decoding the meaning of transference and countertransference: An integrative perspective [Review of the book Transference and countertransference in non-analytic therapy: Double-edged swords]. PsycCRITIQUES-Contemporary Psychology: APA Review of Books, 52 (51).

Boag, S. (2007). Maintaining the illusion of love [Review of the book Demystifying love: Plain talk for the mental health professional]. PsycCRITIQUES-Contemporary Psychology: APA Review of Books , 52 (31).

Electronic:

Boag, S. & Turtle, A. M. (2005). Psychology in the Public Eye: The Cartoonist’s History of Psychology. Available at: www.psych.usyd.edu.au/museum/cartoons/